Abstract -Decision-makers want to perform risk-based cost-benefit prioritization of security investments. However, strong nonlinearities in the most common physical security performance metric make it difficult to use for cost-benefit analysis. This paper extends the definition of risk for security applications and embodies this definition in a new but related security risk metric based on the degree of difficulty an adversary will encounter to successfully execute the most advantageous attack scenario. This metric is compatible with traditional cost-benefit optimization algorithms, and can lead to an objective risk-based cost-benefit method for security investment option prioritization. It also enables decisionmakers to more effectively communicate the justification for their investment decisions with stakeholders and funding authorities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, security analysts have developed robust design processes and evaluation tools [1] to ensure that a fielded security system will provide effective protection against the adversaries for which it was designed. Sophisticated tools help analysts evaluate possible attack paths [2] and predict the effectiveness of security responders [3] so that decision makers can have reasonable assurance that the design-basis adversaries would likely be defeated should they attempt an attack. These systematic analyses ensure the security of many important assets and systems. [4] The chief metric for this assurance is the "probability of effectiveness for the design basis threat" (P E for DBT, or P E|DBT ), which represents the probability that a design basis adversary will fail to achieve the attack objectives even if the most advantageous attack scenario were attempted.
For many years, safety investment decisions have been made using risk-based cost-benefit analysis in which the benefit metric is heavily based on a quantitative estimate of risk reduction. Many seek to perform similar analyses to prioritize security investments, but this has met with limited success, in part because the "attack likelihood" component of risk is often extremely uncertain and not considered when P E|DBT is assessed. Therefore, Sandia National Laboratories has begun a Laboratory Directed Research and Development project to develop a risk-based cost-benefit analysis method to prioritize security investments that overcomes some of these obstacles. The goal of this work is to enable security analysts to describe the benefits of security risk reduction measures based on the degree to which they increase the difficulty for an adversary to successfully prepare and execute an attack that can produce a given level of consequences. The resulting method is highly scalable as it enables robust riskbased cost-benefit security investment prioritization to be performed at levels of granularity ranging from a single target up to multiple targets or facilities across an enterprise.
II. CURRENT STATE OF SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS

A. Current Definition of Risk
Kaplan and Garrick [5] stated the definition of risk that is most commonly used among modern risk analysts as, "Fundamentally... a risk analysis consists of an answer to the following three questions:
1. What can happen? 2. How likely is it that [it] will happen? and 3. If it does happen, what are the consequences?" "To answer these questions we would make a list of outcomes or 'scenarios' [where each line in the list] can be thought of as a triplet <s i , p i , c i > where s i is a scenario identification or description; p i is the probability of that scenario; and c i is the consequence or evaluation measure of that scenario, i.e., the measure of damage. If this table contains all the scenarios we can think of, we can then say that it (the table) is the answer to the question and therefore is the risk." * Therefore, risk is defined as a collection of such triples, and since each scenario is associated with a probability, one can summarize this set of triples as a "risk * Prior to Kaplan and Garrick, the most common definition of risk related to loss expectancy.
Risk was defined as "probability times consequence." Kaplan and Garrick assert that risk is really "probability and consequence."
curve" which satisfies the definition of a statistical complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF).
B. Estimating Security Risk Using the Current Definition
Security risk is frequently thought of in terms of three fundamental components: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. [6] These components can be mapped into the above risk definition as follows. A scenario s i represents a specific threat exploiting particular vulnerabilities to produce consequences. The likelihood of the scenario is composed of two parts: (i) the likelihood that the threat T with particular characteristics (e.g., number of attackers, weapons, tools, etc.) will attempt to carry out an attack (P T ), and (ii) the conditional likelihood that the attack by this threat will be successful (P S|T = 1 -P E|T ).
The consequences of a successful attack are represented by c i . For many highconsequence facilities, attacks are so rare that statistical estimates of P T are highly uncertain. As a result, analysts often neglect P T and assess conditional risk, i.e., the risk that would exist given that the attack were to occur, on the basis of P S|T or P E|T , or, for a design basis threat, P E|DBT . [1] When analysts assess threats, vulnerabilities and consequences, evaluating a range of possible attack paths, security risk is characterized by a set of conditional risk triples that exhibit many of the characteristics described above. These conditional risk triples are used to evaluate the efficacy of proposed risk mitigation options based on the degree to which they improve P E|T or P E|DBT for one or more scenarios s i .
Conditional risk triples have a key drawback that limits their use in cost-benefit analyses: aggregated security risk cannot be computed because conditional probabilities P S|T or P E|T cannot be aggregated as a CCDF. [7] In order to perform this aggregation, several conditions must be met: P T must be estimated, and the scenarios s i must be mutually exclusive and statistically independent. In the world of physical security, this condition is clearly not met because intelligent and malevolent adversaries choose among scenarios and select the one that they believe to be in their best interest. In fact, adversaries even choose among scenarios that are not represented in a facility's scenario set because they may be deterred from attacking a target at one facility and choose to attack a different facility altogether. Consequently, P T for s i can never satisfy the necessary mathematical conditions required for aggregation as required in the traditional definition of risk. † Practical problems also exist when using the traditional definition of risk in a security context. First, P T can only be estimated in a Bayesian sense and is enormously uncertain because we cannot know the intentions of all adversary groups. Historical attacks indicate that adversary choices are not random. Instead, adversaries assemble resources that they believe are sufficient to ensure a high likelihood of a successful attack, or they select targets and plan attacks that † Norm Rasmussen, one of the original giants of risk assessment, said in 1976 that he did not believe that risks involving malevolent human action could be quantified by traditional risk assessment methods like fault tree and event tree analysis because attack probability estimates could not meet important statistical requirements. [7] they believe they can successfully achieve within their available resources and abilities to execute. Hence, even a Bayesian estimate of P T depends strongly on unquantifiable factors like dissuasion, deterrence and the adversary's level of goal commitment. Furthermore, P T can change wildly over time as adversary groups are influenced by local and global political and social events of which we may not even be aware. Thus, the uncertainties in P T are very large and can span several orders of magnitude for extreme but very rare attacks. Hence, investment decisions that are based on such risk estimates often cannot be supported with reasonable statistical confidence.
Ironically, these uncertainties are caused in large part by the very definition of risk. Therefore, using attack probabilities for security risk is less useful than the comparable random event frequencies that make up safety risk analyses. This issue is compounded by the common representation of security risk not as a triple, but as a value obtained by multiplying P T , P S|T , and a metric representing severity of consequence that can also span multiple orders of magnitude.
In current security risk studies, when the collection of conditional risk triples is used to evaluate the efficacy of proposed risk mitigation options, the evaluations often rely on two key assumptions: first, the adversary embodies the design basis threat, and second, the adversary knows and exploits the scenario s i with the highest likelihood of success. As a result, mitigation is effective to the degree that it increases the minimum value of P E|DBT across all scenarios s i . Recall that in assessing P E|T , one must assume that a specific attack scenario against a given target is carried out by an adversary with particular characteristics (e.g., number of attackers, weapons, tools, etc.). Thus, P E|T can change dramatically as different adversary characteristics are considered. Even small changes in the adversary characteristics required to defeat the security system can profoundly affect P E|DBT when the system's breaking point is near the DBT, but very large changes in the adversary characteristics required to defeat the security system can have a negligible effect on P E|DBT when the system's breaking point is not near the DBT. These situations can occur when the design basis threat is changed as new intelligence information indicates that adversary capabilities are increasing or as adversary behaviors reveal that prior threat assumptions no longer hold. The highly nonlinear relationship between the adversary characteristics required to defeat a security system and P E|DBT can make it difficult for security decision makers to prioritize security investment options on the basis of P E|DBT -especially when investments must be prioritized across multiple targets or facilities. [8] It can also result in security systems for which performance and costs are highly sensitive to changes in adversary capabilities and/or threat assumptions.
Using conditional risk for security assessment can also lead to an important unintended side effect. By focusing on the adversary's successes and failures during the hypothesized attack, the analyst can be led to focus only on security risk mitigation options that make the observed adversary successes less likely. In so doing, the analyst may not recognize risk mitigation opportunities outside of the actual attack execution. For example, it may be possible to deny the adversary certainty of information that is critical to attack planning, or to minimize the consequences of the attack through resiliency and redundancy. A holistic perspective is required to ensure that the most cost-effective security mitigation options are discovered and pursued.
C. Extending the Definition of Risk
To overcome the obstacles related to the use of probabilities with malevolent adversaries, we propose a modified definition of risk where, instead of considering the highly uncertain likelihood or probability of an attack, one considers its difficulty for an adversary to successfully accomplish against the target(s) under consideration. Thus, a security risk analysis consists of answers to the following three revised questions:
1 Rather, d i incorporates the threshold threat characteristics needed for an adversary to have a high likelihood of success (i.e., a low value of P E|TT ) when attempting to execute scenario s i at the specific target. It also incorporates the characteristics and complexities of the scenario that might make the scenario difficult for an adversary to accomplish successfully even if they had the requisite threshold threat characteristics. evaluations using this definition do not require revision as adversary motivations change because this risk definition characterizes scenarios and targets rather than estimating the adversary's probability of attack. A comparison of these risk definitions is shown in TABLE 1. For each target, a number of scenarios can be posed, each correlating to a risk triplet. For a given consequence, there is a "threshold threat" that is the lowest difficulty (highest risk) scenario for an adversary to be successful.
D. Applications of Proposed Risk Definition to Security Risk
This work uses the proposed definition by focusing on estimating the minimum threat capabilities [or "threshold threat" (TT) characteristics] and degree of difficulty required for an adversary to accomplish a specific attack scenario that exploits a target's vulnerabilities and induces specific consequences with a reasonably high likelihood of adversary success P S|TT = 1 -P E|TT .
Adversary attack preparation activities are viewed as a project planning exercise, wherein a planner has success criteria (e.g., adequate or desired consequences and thresholds for likelihood of success), and chooses among alternative strategies that meet these criteria (e.g., achievable resources and plausible attack scenarios), while considering the degree of difficulty that will be encountered in order to achieve a successful outcome. Investments reduce security risk as they either (a) increase the difficulty for an adversary to successfully execute the most advantageous attack scenario, or (b) reduce the severity of the scenario's expected consequences. The latter can be measured through existing consequence metrics, but measuring the former requires development of a reasonable and robust metric to characterize the adversary's degree of difficulty in achieving a "successful" attack with likelihood P S|TT = 1 -P E|TT . Thus, the proposed definition and metric build upon the well-known P E -based assessment and design methods, but do not exhibit the strong nonlinear behavior that has been observed for P E|DBT . [8] Building this metric is not straightforward, as it requires one to compare and aggregate + In this paper, a scenario is an attack scenario directed against the specific target under consideration. # Difficulty embodies the challenges that a threat would encounter in gathering and employing resources (e.g., personnel, material, knowledge) and executing the required tasks in order to successfully accomplish the specified scenario. This topic is discussed in detail in Section 3.2. & Success means that the adversary successfully causes their desired consequences for the specific target under consideration.
the relative degree of difficulty for disparate adversaries to successfully prepare for (e.g., acquire the requisite resources) and execute an attack (employ those resources in specific ways against specific targets). However, with such a metric, this definition of risk can form the basis of an objective riskbased cost-benefit analysis method that would enable security investment prioritization using traditional cost-benefit optimization algorithms. The proposed metric is described in Section IV. Using the proposed metric (or some other measure of scenario difficulty), an analyst can compare security risks by comparing attack scenarios' levels of difficulty and consequences. The insights from such comparisons can provide important and useful security risk management insights for a broad range of applications. The objective of a security decision maker might be thought of as follows: to make the easiest attack path as difficult as possible within the constraints imposed by cost, operational and programmatic considerations. Consider a decision maker who is responsible for several sites where each attack leads to similar consequences. Fig. 1 shows how results from this method can be applied to security decision making. Each light-colored bar represents the difficulty of the easiest attack scenario at a notional site in its original (2007) configuration. Note how it was much easier for an adversary to achieve a successful attack at Site D than at any other site. Note also how security at Site B was already significantly better than the original (2008) goal level. The decision maker focused on improving security at Site D, and in 2010, security is much more balanced across the enterprise as the difficulty of the easiest attack is now roughly comparable across all sites (the top of the dark bar in the graph). The decision maker can justify to the funding source why particular security investments were made and describe the specific benefits that the investments produced. Further, if policy changes cause the security goal to change, the decision maker can explain in simple terms to the funding source why additional security investments are necessary. Prioritizing investments is straightforward for this application, and the method is compatible with computerized optimization programs.
The situation where a variety of consequences are possible at a facility (or within an enterprise) is shown in Fig. 2 . Here each identified attack path or scenario is represented as a circle on the scatter plot, with coordinates that represent the scenario's difficulty d i and consequences c i . Scenarios that produce higher consequences and are easier to accomplish are more attractive to an adversary because they represent a more efficient use of resources. Thus, they pose a greater risk and should be a higher priority for remediation. A scenario's risk can be reduced by reducing its consequence potential (moving the circle down), increasing its difficulty (moving it to the right), or a combination of these actions. Note that if one reduces the risk of a scenario s j that is near the center of the pack of circles without also addressing scenarios that are more attractive (those that produce greater consequences and are easier to accomplish, i.e., scenarios whose circles are above and to the left of s j ), the overall security risk may be unaffected by the investment because the most attractive scenarios remain available for adversary exploitation. Thus, the security investments should generally address those scenarios that are non-dominated (i.e., that represent the easiest way to produce consequences greater than or equal to c j ).
Consider Fig. 2 from the perspective of the security decision maker for an enterprise. The X symbols represent the attack scenarios available at one facility, and that facility's manager wishes to mitigate the scenarios that are most attractive at that facility. The enterprise decision maker might use this graph, with circles representing attack scenarios available at other facilities within the enterprise, to inform the facility manager that only minimal security improvements will be supported because the enterprise has greater security risks that must be addressed first. On the other hand, if it is known from intelligence sources that the facility is specifically targeted by credible threats, the enterprise decision maker may decide to support security upgrades at the facility anyway, believing that the easiest attack is not yet difficult enough.
III. RELATIONSHIP TO GAME THEORY
Game theory begins with the assumption that human decision makers are most likely to act in ways that maximize their expected total satisfaction. The term "utility" is often used in both economics and game theory to express a person's degree of satisfaction on a normalized scale ranging from 0 to 1. In games where the player experiences a cost to participate, that cost can be represented as a negative valued utility. A player's net utility for each game outcome can be estimated as the difference between the benefits and costs that the player accrues from that outcome, or U n = U b + U c (where U c is negative). When the outcome of a game (or the result of a decision) is uncertain, the player is likely to act in ways that maximize the expectation value of the net utility. Thus, expected net utility must account for the probabilities of the various potential outcomes. For a simple decision with two possible outcomes (success or failure), the expected net utility is · 1 · where p s is the probability of the success outcome, and subscripts b refer to benefits, c refer to costs, s refer to the success outcome, and f refer to the failure outcome. Note that different outcomes may result in both different benefits and different costs because, for example, an unsuccessful attack may result in a different level of law enforcement pursuit or prosecution than if the same attack had been successful.
A. Simple Two-Player Games
An attack against a facility or an enterprise can be thought of as a two-player game. [9] The defender accrues costs to mount defenses to discourage an attacker, to defeat the attack if it occurs, or to be prepared to mitigate the consequences of a successful attack. The attacker accrues costs if an attack is attempted, and those costs will vary depending on which attack is selected. The attacker accrues benefits by causing the desired consequences if the attack is successful, and may also accrue less tangible benefits (e.g., notoriety and publicity) even if the attack is unsuccessful. The defender's "benefits" are harder to discern, and may simply be the avoidance of additional costs associated with consequences. Both players choose actions in order to maximize their expected net utility given the fact that the attacker has many possible attack scenarios from which to choose, and may choose to attack an altogether different target or even not to attack at all.
The utility experienced by the attacker or defender is related to, but not identical to, the actual metrics for the benefits and costs for their decisions. A player's degree of satisfaction may be nonlinear in one or both of these dimensions. To illustrate this fact, consider the utility related to the cost of a construction project. The decision maker experiences high satisfaction for staying under budget and low satisfaction (even dissatisfaction) for exceeding the budget. But the amount of satisfaction for being 5% under budget is likely much less than the degree of dissatisfaction for being 5% over budget. A utility function captures the nonlinear relationship between measurable quantities and the decision maker's or player's utility. [10] Utility functions are often monotonic, but need not always be so, as in the example of the game show The Price is Right. Here a contestant's utility increases as her price guess increases and approaches the prize's actual price, but she has zero utility for a guess that is even a small amount over the actual price.
Consider now Fig. 2 from the context of game theory. For an adversary who has the objective of executing the easiest attack scenario to obtain the maximum consequences while remaining within their resources and capabilities, this graph can be thought of as plotting approximations for the two components of a net utility analysis U n = U b + U c . The Consequence axis is a surrogate measure for the adversary's U b , and the Difficulty axis is a surrogate for the magnitude of their U c . Attack scenarios that are toward the upper left corner of the graph have a high U n because U b is large and U c is a small negative number. Scenarios that are beyond the adversary's ability to obtain resources and capabilities are farther to the right on the graph, and one can represent this part of the adversary's decision making process by truncating scenarios that are beyond a representative difficulty threshold. One can similarly truncate low-consequence attacks if they are below the adversary's action threshold. The remaining scenarios are candidates from among which the adversary will choose, with the most likely choices having a high net utility U n as represented by the nondominated scenarios toward the upper left of the graph.
Since the adversary's net utility for an attack scenario is the difference between their benefits and costs, their highest net utility, and their ultimate attack choice (if any), will depend on the relative weighting that the specific adversary places on consequences vs. scenario difficulty. One adversary may select the easiest attack that satisfies their consequence threshold, while another may select the attack that has the greatest consequences within their existing capabilities, and a third may work diligently to obtain additional capabilities so that they can successfully execute a scenario that will cause even greater consequences. Thus, for a defender to predict the specific attack to be attempted requires an extraordinarily detailed and accurate knowledge of the value system of the specific adversary. This knowledge is difficult to obtain in the real world. This is a key obstacle to applying game theory and net utility concepts to the prediction of real adversary attacks. Observe, however, that Fig. 2 presents key components of net utility independent of the adversary value system and its associated weighting values or utility functions. In so doing, its representation of the high risk scenarios is more robust to uncertainties in adversary values than are net utility estimates used from traditional game theory.
The risk representation from Fig. 2 also has strong parallels in the Operations Research community. Brown et. al. [11] argue that the optimal way to allocate security investments is as follows. Assume that a system operator wants to operate the system at minimum cost (or minimum consequence in our terminology), and that an adversary wants to impose maximum consequences on that system, consistent with their capabilities. The operator can minimize the adversary's opportunity to cause consequences by minimizing the maximum consequences that can be achieved by an adversary with specified capabilities in what is called a "defender-attacker-defender" optimization model. The robustness of the system to various types of adversaries can be examined by varying the specified capabilities to represent a range of adversaries. This process can be closely mimicked using the representation shown in Fig. 2 . One can represent an adversary's capabilities in terms of the maximum difficulty attack that can be accomplished, and invest resources to minimize the consequences of all scenarios of lesser difficulty. Fig. 2 explicitly portrays the robustness of the system to various types of adversaries without the need to conduct a separate analysis.
B. Multiple Concurrent Linked Two-Player Games
In the real world, facility or enterprise security is more complicated than the simple two-player game described above. It is not what the game theoreticians call a "multiplayer game" because, while it involves multiple players, most currently observed attacks do not involve close active collaboration among multiple independent adversary groups ("coalition behavior"), which is the focus of multiplayer game theory. Instead, facility security can currently be described as a collection of concurrent and linked two-player games in which the defender can make only one move at a time in order to counter the simultaneous moves of all adversaries.
The previous section described how a utility function captures the nonlinear relationship between measurable quantities and the decision maker's or player's utility. It is key to note that a utility function is highly specific to the decision, decision maker, and decision environment at hand. It is timedependent, as the decision maker's preferences are shaped by ongoing events and circumstances. Since the decision maker is different for each adversary group in this collection of concurrent games, it is clear that each adversary group will determine U n using different value systems (weightings for cost vs. benefit), which are embodied in different utility functions, leading to different assessments of U b , U c and U n by different adversaries for the same candidate scenario. Furthermore, these utility functions and value systems are highly uncertain or even unknown to the defender, and are changing over time because of influences that may also be unknown to the defender. In addition, the value systems for real adversaries often also include factors other than attack difficulty and measurable consequences (e.g., the symbolic value of a target), the importance of which may be unknown to the defender. Thus, it may always be difficult to use U n to accurately predict which specific scenario represents the most likely attack path and to plan defender actions accordingly.
Consider now a less restrictive set of assumptions regarding the adversary utility functions in this collection of concurrent games. Let us assume only that the utility functions are monotonic with respect to their surrogates (i.e., the benefit utility value U b increases monotonically with consequences, and the magnitude of the negative cost utility value U c decreases monotonically with scenario difficulty). Using this assumption, let us consider the characteristics of a scenario s i as represented in Fig. 2 
for any adversary value system (weighting for cost vs. benefit) and any set of adversary utility functions based on consequences and scenario difficulty. In other words, given that the utility functions are monotonic, if Fig. 2 shows that s k is above and to the left of s i , then s k is always more attractive to an adversary than s i because it has higher net utility U n . The difference in U n between these scenarios may not be large, depending on the slope of the utility functions, but it is positive.
The trend in U n can be used to aid in the development of a security investment strategy. An analyst can confidently say that one of the undominated scenarios in Fig. 2 represents the highest utility strategy for every adversary if (a) consequence and scenario difficulty are the dominant metrics in the adversary's utility value system, and (b) the metrics for consequence and scenario difficulty are reliable and robust (the implications of this assumption are discussed below). Thus, to reduce the expected net utility of the adversary groups in this collection of concurrent games, one must either increase the difficulty or reduce the consequences of the set of undominated scenarios from Fig. 2 . Increasing scenario difficulty is practiced in military doctrine under the concept of deterrence, while reducing the consequences of a successful attack falls under the concept of target devaluation. Deception modifies the adversaries' perception of a scenario's difficulty or consequence potential. These perceptions are important inputs for adversary attack planning and decision making. Deterrence and devaluation are both forms of dissuasion that seek to influence adversaries' planning activities and reduce their desire to attack. [12] In practice, it may not be possible to address all of the undominated scenarios, and considerations other than security (e.g., operations, safety) may make it undesirable to address certain scenarios. Then the decision maker can allocate security investments using the methods described in Section II D, in conjunction with intelligence assessments, confident that actual security risks are being reduced. More importantly, the decision maker can also reject proposed security investments that affect only scenarios that are not close to the undominated scenario frontier, confident that the investment affects only scenarios with low expected net adversary utility, and which, according to game theory, are much less likely to be selected for execution by one of the adversaries.
A key enabler for this method of security investment prioritization is that the metrics for consequence and scenario difficulty must be accurate and robust. In practice, there is often significant uncertainty in the consequences that would occur as a result of a specific successfully executed attack scenario. More importantly, the "difficulty" of executing a successful attack is an imprecise, subjective and multi-faceted assessment (a proposed initial metric for difficulty is proposed in the next section). For this reason, the assessed values for c i and d i must be viewed as uncertain, and the decision maker cannot focus solely on the undominated scenarios. Instead, one must consider the uncertainties associated with these metrics for the population of scenarios that are near the undominated frontier of Fig. 2 when proposing security investments. Intelligence assessments and historical insights can help decision makers set priorities among competing security investment strategies in light of these uncertainties.
IV. CHARACTERIZING TARGETS: DIFFICULTY OF A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK
The method for security risk assessment described above hinges on developing a metric for simply characterizing targets in terms of the overall difficulty for the generalized set of disparate potential adversaries to conduct successful attacks. While it is easy for an analyst to describe the difficulties inherent in a specific attack scenario, these difficulties are hard to express as a single metric -either qualitative or quantitative -because of the large number of disparate factors that may cause difficulty to an attacker. To date, our research has not uncovered any generally accepted system of metrics to answer the question, "How difficult is it for an adversary to accomplish this scenario?" or the related question, "How much more capable is one adversary compared to another?" However, a few methods have been proposed for other purposes that may be applicable to this problem and provide the benefit of being broadly applicable and unclassified, characteristics that we seek to embody in a risk-based metric for targets. These have been described in various publications [1, 13, 14, 15, 16] , and summarized by the authors in previous papers. [8, 17] The following sections describe a system of metrics designed to describe and summarize the levels of difficulty that adversaries would face in successfully executing attack scenarios.
A. General Characteristics of the Proposed Method
The proposed approach starts by identifying a scenario that would offer an adversary a reasonable expectation of success § against the target(s) under consideration, i.e., a scenario for which the conditional likelihood that the attack by this threat will be successful (P S|T = 1 -P E|T ) exceeds a threshold established for this purpose. Such scenarios can be developed by any number of currently available means that are commonly used by the security analysis and vulnerability assessment community. Specific to each scenario, either explicitly or implicitly, are the resources (personnel, materiel, and knowledge) that an adversary would need to have, and the manner in which they would need to be employed, in order for the adversary to have a reasonable likelihood of success P S|T when executing the scenario against the target(s) under consideration. Considerations of the difficulty for an adversary to mount this scenario are partitioned into the two essential phases of adversary efforts for any attack scenario -Preparation and Execution. Since adversary success in the scenario requires successful completion of both phases, they are viewed with comparable significance.
The primary factors that are generally key to adversary success in each phase of attack have been identified through discussions with subject matter experts, review of various ranking schemes for adversaries or threats or scenarios, and analysis of a diverse set of specific scenarios. Since we require a metric that characterizes the relative difficulty of successfully (inducing and) exploiting target vulnerabilities, we express scenario success factors in terms of their manifestation at the interface between target and threat. For example, while level of funding can be important to adversary success, this is manifested at the target in other factors, such as quality and size of the toolkit used in the scenario. We have developed these factors so that they can be considered as roughly independent dimensions of generally equivalent importance.
In addition to reflecting key factors for scenario success, the required metric must also reflect the relative level of difficulty for adversaries to be successful in the scenario against the target(s) under consideration. To do this, five discrete levels of difficulty have been defined for each success factor dimension. Guidelines are being developed for analysts to consistently assign the appropriate levels to each success factor dimension in order to reflect the relative difficulty that an § For most attack scenarios, "success" means inducing a specific consequence of the adversary's choosing from the target.
adversary would encounter to successfully achieve or acquire the characteristics required in that dimension for the scenario to succeed. It is important to note that this process does not assign adversaries to a particular level, nor imply that all dimensions of a scenario are at the same level. Rather, the process dissects a successful scenario into the minimum levels of difficulty associated with each of the key factors that generally underlie adversary success. Since the scenario is specific to the target(s) under consideration, this process characterizes targets in terms of the levels of adversary difficulty to recognize, induce, and exploit vulnerabilities that enable scenario success.
The levels of difficulty for the dimensions have been calibrated so that a particular level for one dimension roughly correlates to an equivalent level of difficulty for any other dimension. In general, the levels of difficulty correlate with the size of the portion of the spectrum of generalized potential adversaries that could reasonably expect to achieve or acquire the associated level characteristics.
Level 1 characteristics are easily accessible or achievable by the general population, while Level 5 characteristics would typically be accessible or achievable only by elite forces or state supported operations. Different levels of difficulty are distinguished by different levels of costs, quality of leadership, law enforcement or intelligence signatures, time to achieve, availability, ingenuity, and/or sophistication.
B. Dimensions of Success for Attack Preparation
The dominant challenges for adversaries in the Preparation phase of efforts are in developing, acquiring, and preparing the resources -personnel, materiel, and knowledge -required for the scenario without being detected or interdicted by authorities. The dominant resource attributes that are keys to scenario success, and the primary considerations that differentiate levels of difficulty for the adversary to succeed, are:  Active Outsiders: # of Fully Engaged Participants reflects the difficulty an adversary faces to successfully muster and prepare team(s) without alerting authorities, which increases with the number of participants.
 Active Outsiders: Training & Expertise of Fully Engaged
Participants reflects the depth and diversity of expertise required of participants, and by the rehearsal required for tasks.  Support Structure: Size, Complexity, and Commitment reflects the contributions required of a support base during attack preparation, e.g., intelligence, safe haven, training or staging facilities, finances, scientific or technological R&D, and manufacturing. Difficulty varies with the extent, diversity, and quality of contributions required, and the degree of engagement and awareness of purpose for these contributions.  Tools: Availability reflects the difficulty associated with acquiring the tools required to successfully execute a scenario. Tools can include weapons, transportation, breaching equipment, electronics, fixtures, armor, disguise, etc. The levels of difficulty are distinguished by factors that influence their availability: rarity, law enforcement / intelligence signatures associated with their acquisition or staging, and level of controls in place to protect against illicit usage.
 Insiders: # of Contributors is one of three dimensions (key factors for adversary success) associated with contributions from insiders. Difficulty varies with the necessity for insider contributions, the number of contributors required, and the necessity of collaboration among multiple insiders.  Insiders: Security Controls on Contributors reflects how contributions required from insiders that have greater levels of access to security-sensitive features are generally more difficult for adversaries to confidently acquire due to the security controls in place to mitigate the potential for such occurrences.
C. Dimensions of Success for Attack Execution
The manner in which adversaries employ their resources during attack execution can also be critically important to their ability to succeed. The dominant success factor dimensions for attack execution, and the primary considerations that differentiate levels of difficulty for the adversary to succeed, are:  Ingenuity / Inventiveness reflects the degree to which an adversary must be creative or ingenious in order to discover and/or induce, and exploit the vulnerabilities required for a successful attack. Low levels are associated with simple, straightforward attacks that can easily conceived by most adversaries, while high levels are associated with attacks that reflect unique, imaginative approaches that are more likely to surprise and befuddle even very well prepared defenses. 
D. Calculating the Metric
Generalized guidelines (not presented here) have been developed for assigning one of five levels of difficulty to each of the attack Preparation and Execution dimensions for any particular scenario and target(s). A scenario for which an adversary is considered to have a reasonable expectation of success against the target(s) under consideration, i.e., for which (P S|T = 1 -P E|T ) exceeds some threshold established for this purpose, is evaluated according to these guidelines. A numerical value is associated with each of the five levels of difficulty (currently, these are integer values 0 to 4). A dimension's values could also be weighted to reflect that dimension's relative general significance to adversary success, although research to date has not indicated a rationale for other than uniform weighting.
Since the dimensions are roughly independent and span the most significant challenges that are key to adversary success, the level of difficulty for each of the phases of the scenario is calculated as the length of the vector described by the values along each of the phase's dimensions (an L 2 norm). Similarly, the metric for overall difficulty of that scenario for the target(s) under consideration is calculated as the length of the vector described by the levels of difficulty for each phase of adversary activity. This metric is specific to the scenario and target(s) under consideration.
E. Implications and Initial Application of the Metric
It is important to remember that this method produces a metric for characterizing targets (in particular, the response function of target vulnerabilities to threats), and not for characterizing threats, adversaries or scenarios decoupled from specific targets. Because of the qualitative and discrete nature of the assessments, and the diversity of attributes underlying the metric's value, the values are most appropriately interpreted as indicating cohorts of scenarios of similar levels of difficulty required for adversary success in achieving a given level of consequence against the target(s) under consideration. A set of similarly valued conditions (scenario-target pairs) can be considered as a cohort of attack scenarios of comparable difficulty, with differences in values providing a reasonable basis for rank-ordering by level of difficulty. Since the scale for metric values is non-linear, one should not place undo emphasis on ratios of values between cohorts.
While this approach is still under development and has not yet been applied to support cost-benefit assessments for risk mitigation measures, the utility of the metric has been demonstrated by evaluating a diverse set of scenarios with widely varying levels of difficulty and consequences. Evaluated scenarios include physical assaults against high security, high consequence facilities, the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices against both mobile targets and government buildings, pathogenic attacks against food chain targets, and cyber attacks against sensitive databases. The metrics produced for these scenarios have been fully consistent with analysts' and subject matter experts' intuitions regarding relative levels of adversary difficulty. Comparison of the security postures for targets with cohorts and between cohorts indicates the metric reasonably and commonly reflects the net impacts of diverse risk mitigation measures. The evaluation process provided insights into challenges that adversaries must overcome in order to succeed that were not evident in the scenario descriptions, as well as additional opportunities for adversaries to succeed against some targets at lower levels of difficulty. Utility of the metric has been indicated not only for simply characterizing a specific targets' vulnerabilities to a disparate set of threats, but also for comparing the relative vulnerabilities of disparate targets against disparate threats. This reinforces its anticipated relevance to a wide range of security risk-based cost-benefit applications and users.
The key challenge for this method is the development of the metric for characterizing targets in terms of the levels of difficulty for scenarios that would offer adversaries reasonable expectations of success. We are confident that the method described here embodies the desired characteristics necessary to redress important shortfalls of common security risk assessment methods in providing a sound basis for prioritizing investments to mitigate security risk and for communicating the justifications for investment decisions. However, before this method can be brought to fruition, additional work is needed in the following areas:  Mathematics for metric aggregation: Understand the benefits of the various mathematical methods to aggregate difficulty scores across the ~independent dimensions.  Testing: Establish reproducibility of results by independent analysts for disparate targets and threats.  Levels of (un)certainty: Assess and compute levels of (un)certainty for the various risk factors.
[18]  Demonstrate utility: Use this method in prototypical costbenefit applications.
V. CONCLUSION
Existing security cost-benefit analysis methods have had limited success in providing robust insights for decision makers, especially for rare and high-consequence events, because the risk insights on which they depend require estimation of an attack probability. Such probabilities are highly uncertain and can change rapidly with adversary capabilities and intentions. This work provides an enhanced definition of risk in which scenario likelihood is replaced with scenario difficulty. The non-statistical nature of observed adversary planning behavior is modeled by treating scenario consequences and difficulty as distinct dimensions of risk. This view of risk enables risk-based cost-benefit security investment prioritization using traditional optimization algorithms. To implement this approach, we have developed a metric to quantify vulnerability of targets in terms of scenario threshold threats, which represent minimum levels of difficulty for adversaries to succeed in achieving various levels of consequences. This metric characterizes the scenario and target, and is independent of the specific adversary. Thus, it is less sensitive to the uncertainties of changing threat assumptions. When used in conjunction with vigorous and imaginative exploration of potential attack scenarios, these advances enable decision makers to achieve better balance among competing security interests. The method is useful for supporting security risk mitigation decisions at a variety of scales, ranging from individual targets to an enterprise consisting of multiple facilities. Results from this method will provide greater objectivity and unbiased justification for investment decisions; reduce second guessing of investment decisions by funding authorities; leading to more robust and cost-effective security systems.
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